Author´s Name: Andrew Matsiko, **Email contact:** matsikoandrew@yahoo.com

Title: Limited statehood and e-Civil society in the era of digitalization in Uganda: From Failing to survival states?

ABSTRACT

There are emerging new modalities of governance in areas of limited statehoods (ALS). They are implemented by the societal actors in collaboration with the governments of limited states. They bolster good governance and supplement the arms of limited states to provide public (political) goods to all the citizens. In this regard, the use of digital technology enables the new modalities of governance in areas of limited statehoods (ALS). The technological innovations include; Uchanguzi, Ushaid.com etc. They facilitate the provision of public (political) goods: health data and security, fight electoral mal-practice and corruption and protect rights of minorities etc. Therefore, the availability of information technologies bridges the gap where the state is missing or altogether absent. Today, the absence of the state no longer translate into absence of political public goods as long as digital technologies unleashes. This paper explores the effects of digitalization in Africa governments and governance of state particularly in Uganda

Keywords: Limited statehood, Public Goods, ICT, Participation and New governance modalities and societal actors

INTRODUCTION

There is almost a quarter of the population of the world living in the areas of limited statehoods (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.4ff; Rotberg, R, 2004). For decades, however, the debates from scholars of the west focus mostly on the classical issues of state institutions, political behaviours and culture, nature of production and economic relations and citizenship, effects of internet and technology on electoral behaviours and out-comes and social change only in the context of western model of strong states and institutions while giving little focus to the new modalities of state governance of limited statehood of the South in digital age (Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.1). They overlook the reality of the fact that the signals of information technology reached nearly the rest of the parts of the globe including the countries from the South with no strong institutions of the state like the OECD countries (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.1).

Then what is a limited statehood? Unlike strong statehoods with well-organized judicial and political systems, participation in regular politics and elections, rule of law and mechanisms for

the protection of civil rights and liberties of the citizenry (Cf. Tiffiany/Howard, 2014, p.15), limited statehoods are synonymous to failing states (See, Rotberg, Robert, 2013; 2004; Tiffiany/Howard, 2014, p.15; Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.1ff). Thus limited states are states with political, social and economic inabilities to maintain of enforcing or maintain a sustainable monopoly of force, rule of law, making of rules and implementation as well as extension of activities of state beyond capital cities (Cf. Asmolov, Gregory, 2014, p.98; Livingston, S/Drop-Walter, G, 2014, p.1f; Rotberg, R, 2013; 2004; Tiffiany/Howard, 2014, p.15). The limited states are significantly constrained to reach all the citizens within the borders of the nation (Cf. Livingston, S/Drop-Walter, G, 2014, p.1f; Rotberg, R, 2004, p.4). They are unable inherently because of geography, physical, or fundamental economic constraints; or they may be strong but temporally or situationally weak because of internal antagonism, management flaws, greed, despotism, or external invasions and corruption (Cf. Rotberg, R, 2004, p.4).

In fact, the authorities in areas of limited statehoods (ALS) are unable to extend full political (public) goods such security, education, medical care and sanitation to all members of the citizenry (Cf. Livingston, S/Drop-Walter, Gregor, 2014, p.1f; Rotberg, Robert, 2013; Rotberg, Robert, 2004, p.4; Tiffiany/Howard, 2014, p.15). They face religious, linguistic, intercommunal and ethnicity tensions and gross urban crime rates which at times erupt into uncontrollable violence to challenge the internal power of the state. Similarly, among others, the areas of limited statehood (ALS) present; dilapidated transport systems and communication networks, neglect of social service infrastructures: schools and hospitals, and economic decline and high moral decadency in forms of corruption and greed. The provision of adequate public (political) goods is absolutely a myth and diminishes everyday among the citizenry of a country (Cf. Tiffiany, Howard, 2014, p.15; Rotberg, R, 2004, p.4; Livingston, S/Drop-Walter, 2014, p.1ff).

The Democratic of Republic of Congo (DRC) and Afghanistan are uncontested areas of limited statehoods (ALS) which are highly unable to sustain monopoly political and administrative controls often beyond their capital cities (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.5f). The latter as well as the former shows only a fare better maintenance of monopoly of force and rule implementation in core urban areas than they are able to do in the peripherals. Otherwise, beyond cities lies vast stretches of ungoverned territories where the authorities of the state are weak to sustain administrative and political controls or they are altogether absent (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.5f; Rotberg, R, 2004). The central institutions of the Democratic Republic of Congo are constrained to exercise the monopoly use of force to implement political decisions (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.5; Rotberg, R, 2004).

Similarly, urban slums of Kenyan in Mathare and Kibera in Nairobi reflects also a form of constrained state governance and absence of the state within which the ability of the state to supply local public goods in such areas remains a nightmare of the authorities of the state (Cf. Livingston, S/Drop Walter, 2014, p.5). These offer examples of areas of limited statehood (ALS) at the heart of a territorial state. They thus exist wherever the ability of the state to public goods, implement and enforce the monopoly of force and political decisions is deficit in the inner areas of the urban centres (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.5).

However, some limited states are stronger in setting especially autocratic regimes. The autocratic regimes ruled by despots rigidly control the dissent and shows signs of secure statehoods but sadly they are at the same time unable to deliver enough public (political) goods to all members of the citizenry other than only provision of secure borders (Cf. Rotberg, R, 2004, p.5). In Ethiopian, for example, under the regime of "Mengistu Haile Mariam" there were secure and controlled state borders while thousands of the citizens starved to death during the hidden hunger crisis in 980s. The authoritarian regimes often also react to the crisis of legitimacy through the use of repression of members of the citizenry (Cf. Kersting, N, 2013, p.272). This article therefore ought to investigate the state of areas of limited statehood (ALS) in the digital age: how has the digital age enabled/supplemented the provision of (political) public goods? How has digital age enabled/face-lifted citizen participation? How has the digital age influenced changes in the autocratic regimes in the global south?

Digital enabled provision of public good in ungoverned territories

The absence of fully state as well as institutions does not necessarily translate into or mean the absence of other forms governance or modalities of provision of public (political) goods to members of the citizenry (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.5f). How has then the digital penetration enabled/supplemented the provision of public (public) goods? Recently, state governance in areas of limited statehood (ALS) has taken new twists. Unlike the Global North models of statehood and provision of public (political) goods, the areas of limited statehood (ALS) of the Global South shows new forms of governance and modalities with different forms of actors as well as procedures of provision of public (political) goods (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.5). In fact, today, in areas of limited statehood (ALS), the traditional responsibility of provision of public (political) goods by the states to citizens is being supplemented by different societal actors especially non-state actors (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.4ff). Why are non-state actors essential in the new twist of governance?

A severe lack of sufficient provisions of basic social services from state create governance gaps which prompts the coming in of informal sector, media, traditional authorities and civil society actors so as to improvise other mechanisms of provision of public goods to fill the governance deficits in the ungoverned territories (Cf. Kovacic, P/Jamie, L, 2014, p.115; Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.6f). The reinforcement from the societal actors ensure the balance of power in the executive arm of the government through transparency, awareness and mobilization of general public so as to ensure good governance (Cf. Siegle, J, 2014, p.63). In other words, the governance constituency (stakeholders) organize using other forms of new governance modalities to provide collective public goods that the authorities of the state are unable to deliver to the entire population of the country. They thus substitute some of the responsibilities of the state to fill the state governance deficits (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.10).

The non-state actors have taken over the role of government in ungoverned territories so as to address the immediate pressing present problems of communities (Cf. Kovacic, P/Jamie, L, 2014, p.115f; Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.6f). In Kenya, for instance, there is lack of statistical data about the quality and quantity of delivery of services to the citizenry because of state being weak and sometimes is missing. In this regard, therefore, the recent rise of information technologies allow non-state actors to fill some of the information gaps left out by the state because of inability, incompetence and lack of interest (Cf. Kovacic, P/Jamie, L, 2014, p.115f; Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.5f). They use new information technologies to map the problems of the communities and provide public (political) goods to the citizenry, for example, geographical information systems (GIS) assist the non-state actors in the production of quantitative data about inadequate public (political) goods: health, education, water, drainage and housing in slums in which they use later to inform the state for better extension of public goods to the citizenry (Cf. Kovacic, P/Jamie, L, 2014, p.115f; Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.5).

There is high subscription of new advanced technologies: mobile telephones, remote sensing satellites and geographical information systems (GIS) in the Southern world (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.6), which is lowering the costs of gathering of information and collection, retrieving, creating, storing and distribution of information (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.11; Norris, P, 2012, p.66). For instance, mobile phone in Africa increased tenfold in the last decade reaching a third of the entire population (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.5). The growth rate of mobile phone subscribers is the highest in the world. Africa shows 20% growth of mobile phone subscription each year for the past five years,

from 2% of the population in 2000 to 28% in by the end of 2009 (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.6). At the end of 2015, Sub-Saharan Africa had high numbers of persons with mobile phones than the access to electricity (Cf. Rao, 2011; Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.6), and in 2020 almost every citizen in Africa will access a SIM-card (Cf. Salz, 2011, Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.6).

Thus the promotion of opportunities for groups of individuals and identities to coalesce and coordinate with each other at lower costs than before the advancement of new information technologies (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.11). The availability of high resolution commercial remote sensing satellites to the public enhances the non-state actors with a technical capability that was before an exclusively preserve of a few powerful states (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.6). For instance, technological services from "Digital-Globe" which is one of the first premier remote sensing firms empowers the "satellite-sentinel project" with high satellite remote sensing resolutions to monitor the abuse of human rights in Sudan (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.6). Similarly, the social movements: anti-war movements, climate change, good governance, human rights, rule of law and protection of minorities tap into innovations of information technologies to mobilize the world population for defence of the most specific common causes (Cf. Wojick, S, 2012, p.126).

Moreover, with the narrowing down of digital divide between the North and Global South (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.6), new information technologies facilitate the great accessibility of information links between the societal actors, citizenry and state altogether to interact (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.9; Kersting, N, 2009; Kersting, N, 2012, p.11). In Nigeria, for instance, there is a form of crowd-corruption monitoring systems which fosters the citizen and non-state actors to submit their anonymous reports to pin against the alarming cases of soliciting of bribes from the citizens of Nigeria by the Nigerian police (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.9). Similarly, crowdsourcing is used to populate significant on a digital map in the context of disaster, crisis or political events (Cf. Kersting, N, 2012; Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.6ff). In fact, the citizenry caught up in crises or disaster areas use mobile phones to share awareness of the local circumstances with the central aggregating platforms such as ushaidi.com (Cf. Livingston, S/Walter-Drop, 2014, p.6f; Kersting, N, 2012; Siegle, J, 2014, p.66ff; Srinivasan, S, 2014, p.93).

In Kenya, for instance, in 2007 utilized cell-phones to respond to the ethnic clashes and intercommunal tensions and violence in elections between the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki and the opposition presidential candidate Raila Odinga (Cf. Kersting, N, 2012, p.25).

They were further utilized in post-election crisis to report and provide anonymous witness information against the perpetuators of the violence in elections and crimes against humanity in the courts of law (Cf. Kersting, N, 2012, p.25). In Uganda, also the digital communication innovations bolster collective crowd-monitoring of supply of health supplements in stocking of medical supplies to empty pharmacies in public hospital and information support to sensitize members of the community about the dangers of HIV disease (Cf. Srinivasan, S, 2014, p.84ff).

Similarly, between 1984 and 1985, Ethiopia faced a historic hunger crisis (Cf. Siegle, J, 20014, p.70). The regimes of "Mengistu Haile Mariam" secretly hidden famine in the country, however, the media ably exposed the tragedy of famine that starved thousands of Ethiopians to death (Cf. Siegle, J, 2014, p.70). As result, therefore, there was later huge exertion of pressure from societal actors as well as media fraternity on to the regime of "Mengistu Haile Mariam" and the international community to rescue a thousands of innocent lives starving from famine in Ethiopian (Cf. Siegle, J, 2014, p.70).

Linking the new face of citizen participation and digital age

Older democracies show the symptoms of participatory crisis and legitimisation crisis of political systems (Cf. Kersting, N, 2013, p.271; Kersting, N, 2007, p.31). Globally, the system of electoral representative democracies are highly criticised (Cf. Kersting, N, 2007, p.31). The national and regional levels shows that the "post parliamentism" seem to have dominated the phenomenon (Cf. Kersting, N, 2007, p.31). Although the parliament is a central political representative body in the process of making political, economic and social decisions, the original powers and functions of the parliament are being undermined by the supra-national organisations,[1] technical personnel and media (Cf. Kersting, N, 2007, p.31). Globalisation and privatisation seem to have led to international economic organisations and companies to

---

[1] In this case of Europe, Supra-nation organization would basically refer to the European Union

dominate politics (Cf. Kersting, N, 2007, p.31). The voter apathy and political cynicism is growing (Cf. Kersting, N, 2013, p.271).

On the other hand, conventional political participation is decreasing (Cf. Kersting, N, 2013, p.271). This is often reflected by the low rates of participation in the representative spheres as well as shrinking national and local election turnouts (Cf. Kersting, N, 2007, p.32f). Political parties are continuously seen as empty railway stations or abandoned pizza[2], in which political debates are lacking (Cf. Kersting, N, 2013, p.271). Often at times the domination of political elites in the decision making in formal organisations and political parties contribute to the growing participatory crisis and political apathy (Cf. Kersting, N, 2013, p.271-272). As a result of citizenry dissatisfaction, the political systems improvised the "Invited form of spaces" which include; "referendums", "round tables", or "forums" so as to encourage citizens to engage in political parties (Cf. Kersting, N, 2013, p.271). The invited spaces meant to satisfy the citizenry. However, some of these experiments of the "Invited spaces" remained still dominated and controlled by political elites and formal institutions (Cf. Kersting, N, 2013, p.271).

How has digital age enabled/face-lifted citizen participation in politics? Dissatisfaction of citizens from the "Invited spaces" led the invention of news forms of participation (Cf. Kersting, N, 2013, 271f). In this regard, the citizenry founded their own forms of participation and channels to express their interests through "Invented spaces" as an answer to counteract the hierarchical elite dominated intervention and egoism (Cf. Kersting, N, 2013, p.271). New forms of protest and participation were developed as a kind of public counterweight to the existing political structures.

They challenge the existing political structures and the domination of political elites particularly in making social, economic and political decisions (Cf. Kersting, N, 2013, p.271). The Invented spaces constitute: smart-mobs, flash-mobs, geo-services (Ushaidi), candidate watch-Uchaguzi, weblogs, social media, E-conferences, smart vote, E-budgeting and E-voting (Cf. Kersting, N, 2013, p.272). The civil societies utilize new forms of demonstrative participation to mobilise and influence government policies or challenge the existing policies and decisions of the government (Cf. Kersting, N, 2012). Below the rhombus explains the "Invented spaces Vs Invited spaces (see, rhombus as adopted from: Kersting, N, 2013)

---

[2] See for these Metaphor used by Tourain (1971), and Kersting et al. (2009), in Kersting (2013)

Participatory Rhombus in democracies

"Invented space" --- "Invited space"

Directdemocratic Participation:
Initiative/Referendum
Opinion polls
Petition
Participatory budgeting

E-participatory budgeting
E-petition
Geo-social services: "Usahidi"
E-voting

Demonstrative Participation
Demonstration
Letters to the editor (newspaper)

Crowd Planing
Candidate watch

Representative Participation
Voting
Political contacts
Political parties

Smart mobs/Flash mobs
Crowd Monitoring

VAAs: "smart vote"
Weblogs
Social media

Kersting 2013:
Online participation. From
invented to invited space. In:
IJEG 2013

Deliberative Participation
Forum (Assembly)
Mini-public (Deliberative Polls)
Modern Advisory boards (youth,
migrants, Submunicipal Councils etc.)

They mobilise the geographically dispersed and distant communities to participate, interact and share information on different perspectives of public interest (Cf. Nabatchi, T, 2012, p.102; Wojick, S, 2012, p.2; Livingston, S, 2011; Hague, B, N/Loader, B, D, 1999, p.13; UNDP, 2012, p.19; Lenk, K, 1999, p.88; Pina, V/ Royo, S, 2010, p.4; Margetts, 2011, p.518; Hussain, M, M, & Howard, P, N, 2014, p.17), which increases the degree of interest of citizens in civic engagement and participation in political life (Cf. Pina, V/ Royo, S, 2010, p.4; Margetts, H, 2011, p.518). Electronic enhanced demonstrative participation examples include; the shopping mall demonstration in Istanbul in Turkey, the Stuttgart main train and the Frankfurt anti-austerity campaign in Germany and political demonstration in Tahir square in Egypt.

In 2010, for instance, Egyptians used digital innovations to deliberate on everyday governance issues (Cf. Srinivasan, S, 2014, p.93). They used "harassMap" utilised-the technological innovation of frontline-SMS to capture and exchange messages from torture victims by the agents of the autocratic regime through which even their street location were document and mapped online by the use of Ushaidi platform (Cf. Srinivasan, S, 2014, p.93). Others were the Maidan in Kiev in Ukraine and the demonstrations about local Bus transport fares in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (Cf. Kersting, N, 2015, p.321; Kersting, N, 2013; Kersting, N, 2012, p.15).

The internet narrows down the political distances, knowledge and information gaps between the classes of ruling elites and the local citizens in the general public (Cf. Hale, M et al, 1999, p.106; Kersting, N, 2013; World Bank, 2016, p.1f), and overcomes the barriers of time and

space and facilitates both the flow and dissemination of information from the governments and direct feedback from citizens to the government and citizen participation in public life (Cf. Hague, B, N/Loader, B, D, 1999, p.13; Livingston, S, & Walter-Drop, G, 2014, p.7f).

In fact, citizens use democratic innovations to monitor the behaviours of political managers. Democratic innovations like "Abgeordnetenwatch" in Germany, "UReport or SOL in Uganda" and "Huduma in Kenya" are utilised by citizens for monitoring local politicians in governments (Cf. Kersting, N, 2012, p.25). These forms of politician watch documented behaviours of politicians and voting patterns of the members of parliaments and councils are utilised to assess pre-election promises and their party manifestos (Cf. Kersting, N, 2012, p.25). The citizens are able to effectively and efficiently monitor and scrutinise political organizations by publishing documents in internet, organize online campaigns and petitions (Cf. Aichholzer G, Kubicek, H, & Torres, L, 2016, p.17).

Linking autocratic regimes changes and the digital age

There were significant experiences of mass uprisings in North Africa and Middle East. The result of the uprisings saw the fall of some regimes while others became more resilient and brutal: Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Libya etc. and others: Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia succumbed to a huge concessions: welfare packages, governance and policy reforms etc. (Cf. Norris, P, 2012, p.55; Siegle, J, 2012). However, the debates about the causes of mass protests is still full of mixed controversies among scholars. A mix of debates show that there were other deep-rooted causes of the mass uprisings in North Africa and Middle East while other emphasise only on the role of information technologies. However, the debates on the role of the launch of information technologies seem reflects a sort of exaggerations from western commentators compared to other forms of deep-rooted causes of the contentious politics and popular uprisings (Cf. Norris, P, 2012, p.55).

The group of citizens using YouTube, Facebook etc. can be informed of the unfolding events in Egypt and Syria and the rest of the world without necessarily influencing them to willingly participate in risky demonstrations. The dissident leaders are likely to organize and mobilise activities among the activist elites without necessarily managing to mobilise the general public (Cf. Norris, P, 2012, p.57). In addition, estimates of data shows that in February in 2010, out of 801 million of Facebook users in the world, almost 30 million lived in the Middle East and North Africa had only 3.8 percent. The usage showed variations among the citizenry (Cf. Norris, P, 2012, p.62).

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) had about 57%, Qatar 51% and Bahrain with 45% of users of internet on Facebook. In Middle East, thus, statistical data shows Qatar and United Arab Emirates (UAE) as countries with high figures of internet connections and Facebook users in the world but surprisingly enough these connections in Qatar and United Arab Emirates did not influence the propensity of political culture change and protests (Cf. Norris, P, 2012, p.62-63). But countries of the lowest users of Facebook and internet connection ignited uprisings. For instance, Internet connections and Facebook users in Libya were (7%), Iraq (5%) and Yemen (2%) and Tunisia (28%) of internet connections and Facebook users (Cf. Norris, P, 2012, p.63)

Nevertheless, the role of information technologies in the waves of the uprising is not undermined. The scholars from the west attribute the uprisings to the rise of digital age (Cf. Norris, P, 2012, p.55). How has the digital age influenced changes in autocratic regime? In seeking to explain these events, numerous commentators from the west emphasise the information and communication technologies to have played a big role in the unfolding of the mass uprisings in the regions of North Africa and Middle East. There is an argument fronting that the availability as well as access to social media: face book, Myspace, Twitter, and You-Tube is sought to have facilitated the continuous politics in the region with the ability to undermine autocratic regimes control of airwaves and the streets (Cf. Norris, P, 2012, p.55). The citizens of the regions of North Africa and the Middle East were no longer self-censored or controlled by the threats and intimidation from the agencies of the state as was in the previous (Cf. Norris, P, 2012, p.66). The claim of this nature gains more plausibility among political scientists as well as other disciplines from the way Middle East experienced a massive waves of technological changes since the launch of Aljazeera in the early 1996, with the access to satellite televisions, mobile telephones and social media platforms which spread faster than oil slick in the gulf (Cf. Norris, P, 2012, p.55).

The internet enabled social media networks such as the "Face-book", "Myspace" and "Twitter" helped the citizens in north Africa and Middle East to participate in the Arab mass uprisings to pressurise some of the autocratic regimes to concede power (Cf. Hussain, M, M, & Howard, P, N, 2014, p.18; Garner, R, et al, 2016, p.288; Kersting, N, 2015, p.321; Kersting, N, 2012, p.13).

They undermine the regime control of traditional spaces of participation (see; Kersting, N, 2013, p.271-272). The conventional forms of political engagement: public meeting, distribution of communication materials such as flyers in political campaigns and mobilisation of the public often exposes participants to face to face brutal repression, harassment and abuse from the agencies of state in military repressive regimes (Cf. Wojcik, S, 2012, p.126; Siegle, J, 2014,

p.70; Kersting, N, 2013). On contrary, therefore, the new more fluid, ephemeral practices of political engagement enhanced by information technologies empower citizens with access to internet to exchange and ideological preferences in a more freely relaxed and convenient form of deliberation (Cf. Wojcik, S, 2012, p.126).

They are free of harassment and interference from the agencies of the state (Cf. Wojick, S, 2012, p.126; Norris, Pippa, 2012, p.55; Nabatchi, T, et al, 2012, p.113; Kersting, N, 2013, p.271f; Garner, R, et al, 2016, p.288; Kersting, N, 2012, p.28f). The provision of the features of anonymity embedded in unconventional participation encourages citizen to fully participate in political discourse without fear of repression and harassment from the agencies of the state (Cf. Nabatchi, T, et al, 2012, p.113; Kersting, N, 2013; Garner, R, et al, 2016, p.288; Kersting, N, 2012, p.28). In this regard, the citizens engaged in certain governance deliberations are less accountable for their ideas and contributions as well as exchange of opinions in highly sensitive public discourses (Cf. Nabatchi, T, et al, 2012, p.113; Kersting, N, 2013, p.271ff; Wojick, S, 2012, p.127). Thus they are free from fear, harassment and retribution from external operatives of the state (Wojick, S, 2012, p.126f; Kersting, N, 2012, p.28).

In 2000, for example, in Philippines and Indonesia in 1998 respectively saw a massive explosion of mobile phone-SMS texting that rapidly ousted a democratically elected president out of power. Their citizens accused the duo: President Joseph Estrada of Philippines and Suharto of Indonesia of corruption, mismanagement of the resources of state and highest public offices (Cf. Garner, R, et al, 2016, p.288; Hussain, M, M, & Howard, P, N, 2014, p.20). Thus the internet enhanced technologies as well as mobile phone technologies have facilitated the change of governments considered unfit to serve in favor of the interest of the general public but rather only the interests of few individuals from the elite ruling classes. The citizen and supporters are easily organized, mobilised and coordinated to mobilise as well as engage in mass protests to challenge the state very fast and unexpectedly in real time (Cf. Garner, R, et al, 2016, p.288; Hussain, M, M, & Howard, P, N, 2014, p.20).

CONCLUSION

The full scale influence of information technology in the uprisings in North Africa and Middle East is still full of mixed discontents from scholars as others cited exaggeration of the role of digital technologies. The discontent emanates from the use of semantics. The commentators from the west mix digital technologies with the cause of the uprising while others see it only as a facilitator but not a cause. On the other hand, regardless of the discontents, the digital

revolution plays a big role in the areas of limited statehoods (ALS). It enables societal actors: Media, CSOs and the institutions of state to collaborate, organize, mobilise and coordinate to avail citizens with immediate and pressing needs of public goods in their vicinity. It enables the filling of governance gaps created by missing of state institutions or altogether absent. All in all, the new digital technologies are only facilitators of only an already ripe cause but not the cause.

References

Aichholzer, George. /Kubicek, Herbert. / Torres, L. eds. (2016): Evaluating e-Participation. Public Administration and Information Technology vol. 19, Springer international Publishing

Garner, Robert et al (2016), Introduction to politics, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press

Hague, Barry N. / Loader, Brian, D. eds. (1999): Digital Democracy: Discourse and Decision making in the information Age, London: Routledge

Hale, Mathew. /Musso Juliet. / Weare, Christopher (1999): Developing digital democracy: Evidence from California municipal web pages, In: Hague, N, B/ Loader, B, D. (eds.) Digital Democracy: Discourse and Decision making in the information Age, London: Routledge, pp.96-115

Hussain, Muzammil M. / Howard, Phillip N (2014): Information Technology and the Limited States of the Arab Spring. In: Livingston, S, Drop-Walter, G. (eds.), Bits and Atoms: Information and communication technology in Areas of limited statehood, Oxford University press, pp. 17-29

Kersting, Norbert (2007): Assessing local referendums and innovative participatory instruments. In: Delwit, Pascal/Jean-Benoit/ Reynaert, Herwig/ Steyvers, Kristof (Eds.), Local Political Leadership in Europe, Nomos, pp. 31-49

Kersting, Norbert (2013): "Online participation: from "invited" to "invented" spaces, Int. J. Electronic Governance, vol. 6, No 4, pp.270-280

Kersting, Norbert (2015), Local political participation in Europe: Elections and Referendums. HKJU-CCPA 15(2):319-334

Kersting, Norbert. ed. (2012), Electronic Democracy, Opladen, Germany Barbara Budrich publishers

Kovacic, Primoz, Lundine, Jamie (2014): Mapping Kibera. Empowering Slum residents by ICT. In: Livingston, S, Drop-Walter, G. (eds.) Bits and Atoms: Information and communication technology in Areas of limited statehood, Oxford: Oxford University press, pp. 115-129

Lenk, Klaus. (1999), Electronic support of citizen participation in planning process, In: Hague, N, B/ Loader, B, D. (eds.) Digital Democracy: Discourse and Decision making in the information Age, London: Routledge, pp.87-95

Livingston, Steven, Drop-Walter, Gregor. eds. (2014): Bits and Atoms: Information and communication technology in Areas of limited statehood, New York: Oxford University press

Locke, Trevor (1999): Participation, inclusion and netactivism: how the internet invents new forms of democratic activity. In: Hague, N, B/ Loader, B, D. (eds.) Digital Democracy: Discourse and Decision making in the information Age, London: Routledge, pp.211-221

Margetts, Hellen. (2011): The Internet and Transparency. The Political Quarterly, 82: 518–521. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-923X.2011.02253.x

Nabatchi, Tina et al. eds (2012): Democracy in motion: Evaluating the practice and impact of deliberative civic engagement, Oxford: Oxford University press

Norris, Pippa (2001): Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, Pippa (2012): Political mobilisation and social networks: The example of the Arab spring. In: Kersting, N. (ed), Electronic Democracy, Barbara Budrich publishers, Opladen, Germany, pp.55-76

Rotberg, R (2013): Africa Emerges: Consummate challenges, abundant opportunities. Cambridge: Polity press

Rotberg, R. I (2004): The failure and collapse of Nation-states: Breakdown, prevention and repair. In Rotberg, R.I. (ed.) When states fall: Causes and consequences. Princeton: Princeton university press

Siegle, Joseph (2014): ICT and Accountability in Areas of limited Statehood. In: Livingston, S/Drop Walter, G. (eds.) Bits and Atoms: Information communication technology in Areas of limited statehood, Oxford University press, pp. 61-75

Srinivasan, Sharath (2014): FrontlineSMS, Mobile-for-Development, and the "Long Tail" of governance. In: Livingston, S, Drop-Walter, G. (eds.) Bits and Atoms: Information and

communication technology in Areas of limited statehood, New York: Oxford University press, pp. 79-97

Tiffiany/Howard (2014): Failed states and the origins of violence: A comparative analysis of state failures as root cause of terrorism and political violence. Farnham: Ashgate publishers

Wojcik, Stephanie, (2012): Open Government and Open Data. In: Kersting, N. (ed) Electronic Democracy. Opladen, Germany: Barbara Budrich publishers, pp.125-146

World Bank. (2016): World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0671-1. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO